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Banning Books in Public Schools: Board of
Education v. Pico

In Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico five members of the
Supreme Court, in three separateopinions, held that the first amendment
places some constraints on a school board'spower to remove books from
its school libraries. Although the opinions were couched in terms of
preventing censorship,the effect of this decision was to create a rightguaranteeing students access to books approved by the federaljudiciary.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In February 1976, the Island Trees Board of Education' ordered
nine books removed from the school district's libraries and curric-

ula. 2 Incidents such as this immediately conjure up words like
"book banning" and "censorship," and images of book burnings.
No self-respecting citizen with a knowledge of history 3 can look

upon such incidents with equanimity. These emotional reactions,
however, must not interfere with the resolution of the legal issues

raised by book removal cases. This note will attempt to analyze
how the Supreme Court resolved the legal issues raised in the
most recent book removal case, Board of Education v. Pico.4
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In September 1975, three members of the Board of Education of
the Island Trees Union District No. 26 attended a conference
sponsored by Parents of New York United, "a politically conserva-

tive organization of parents concerned about education legislation
in the State of New York." 5 At the conference, the Board members obtained lists of books described by one Board member as
1. The Island Trees Union Free School District comprises 2.5 square miles in
Levittown, Long Island, New York. Its population is almost exclusively white and
is largely Italian and Irish. Comment, Censoring the School Library: Do Students
Have the Right to Read?, 10 CoNN. L REV. 747 & n.3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
2. See infra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
3. Plato urged prohibiting students from reading Homer; in Nazi Germany,
20,000 "un-German" volumes were burned in Berlin Square. Comment, supra note
1, at 747, 749-50 &nn.14 & 16.
4. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
5. Id. at 2802.

"'objectionable'"6 and by another as "'improper fare for school
students.' "7 Interspersed in the lists of titles and authors of the
"objectionable books"8 were quotations containing vulgar and indecent language and politically directed comments. 9
On the evening of December 7, 1975, two of the Board members
gained entrance to the high school library through the custodian,
compared the lists of "objectionable books" to the library card
catalogue' 0 and found nine "objectionable books" on the library
shelves." It was later discovered that the junior high school library contained an additional "objectionable book."12 Another
such book, which had previously been approved by the Board in
1972, was also being used in a twelfth grade literature course. 13
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 407 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 102 S. Ct. 2799
(1982). One list was culled from books found in Randolph High School, Randolph,
New York. The other list was compiled by an organization called the Concerned
Citizens and Taxpayers for Decent School Books of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 638
F.2d at 407.
9. 638 F.2d at 407-08. For excerpts of the vulgar and indecent language, see
102 S. Ct. at 2823-27. Examples of the political and social comments include:
Title: Soul on Ice by Eldridge Cleaver (Leader of Black panther [sic] and
not allowed to live in America)
THIS BOOK WAS RETAINED FOR SENIORS ONLY IN RANDOLPH.
THE BOOK IS FULL OF ANTI-AMERICAN MATERIAL AND HATE FOR
WHITE WOMEN. WHY WOULD TEACHERS WANT HIGH SCHOOL

STUDENTS TO READ THIS???? OUR GROUP IS GOING TO FILE A
COMPLAINT AGAINST THIS BOOK ON SEDITIOUS AND DISLOYAL
MATTER.
638 F.2d at 407.
Title: Go Ask Alice by Anonymous. (Suppose[d] to be diary of a 15 year
old girl) . . . Parents, do not be fooled by the movie version of this book.
It reads a lot different. If teachers cannot find a better book than this to
illustrate drugs are bad then what are we paying them for. They justify
their viewpoint because the girl dies in the end. A lot of teachers think
this is a great book?????????
638 F.2d at 407-08.
"A Reader for Writers-A Critical Anthology of Prose Readings by Jerome W.
Archer-This book equates ... Malcolm X, considered by many to be a traitor to
this country, with the founding fathers of our country." 638 F.2d at 408.
10. Id. at 408.
11. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 389 & n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638
F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). The Board members found:
SLAUGHTER HOUSE FrvE, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; THE NAKED APE, by Desmond Morris; DoWN THESE MEAN STREETS, by Piri Thomas; BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO
WRITERS, Langston Hughes, ed.; Go ASK ALICE, by Anonymous; LAUGHING Boy, by
Oliver La Farge; BLACK Boy, by Richard Wright; A HERO AIN'T NOTHIN' BUT A
SANDWICH, by Alice Childress; and SOUL ON ICE, by Eldrige Cleaver. All of these
books have received literary acclaim, are on many recommended reading lists, and
are commonly selected for high school libraries across the country. Comment,
supra note 1, at 747 n.4.
12. 474 F. Supp. at 389 & n.3. The additional book was A READER FOR WRITERS,
by Jerome Archer, ed.
13. 474 F. Supp. at 389 & n.4. THE FIXER, by Bernard Malamud.
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At an informal, "private" Board meeting held on February 24,
1976, the Board "unofficially directed" the principals of the junior
and senior high schools to remove the books.14 When the book removal became publicized, the Board issued a press release in an
attempt to justify its actions.' 5 The press release stated in part:
While at the conference, we learned of books found in schools throughout the country which were anti-American, anti-Christian, and antiSemetic [sic], and just plain filthy.
To date, what we have found is that the books do, in fact, contain material which is offensive to Christians, Jews, Blacks and Americans in general. 16 In addition, these books contain 1 7obscenities, blasphemies,
brutality, and perversion beyond description.
While most of us agree that these books have a place on the shelves of
the public library, 1 8 we all agree that these books simply DO NOT belong
14. 474 F. Supp. at 389-90. The superintendent submitted a written objection to
the removal, stating in part:
My objection to direct action banning all the books on the list purchased
[sic] at Watkins Glen is that we don't know who developed the list, nor
the criteria they used. I don't believe we should accept and act on someone else's list, unless we first study the books ourselves.
, * * [W]e already have a policy ... designed expressly to handle such
problems. It calls for the Superintendent, upon receiving an objection to a
book or books, to appoint a committee to study them and make recommendations. I feel it is a good policy-and it is Board policy--and that it
should be followed in this instance. Furthermore, I think it can be followed quietly and in such a way as to reduce, perhaps avoid, the public
furor which has always attended such issues in the past.
* ' * I have no doubt (but of course no proof) that such a local committee would end up agreeing about most of the books on the list. The
Board's feeling on them are not so different from the staff's and parents'after all, that is shown by the fact that the large majority of the books are
not and apparently never have been recommended and used by the staff.
...
[U]nilateral banning by the Board, without inputs by the staff,
would surely create a furious uproar-not only in the staff, but across the
community, Long Island and the state. I don't believe you want such an
uproar, and I certainly don't.
638 F.2d at 409.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 2803.
16. Two Board members testified that A HERO AIN'T NOTHiN' BUT A SANDWICH
was, in their view, anti-American, because in the book a black teacher in a
predominantly black school calls her students' attention to the fact that George
Washington was a slave owner. 638 F.2d at 436 n.7 (Newman, J., concurring).
17. A READER FOR WRrrERs did not contain vulgar or indecent language, but it
did contain a story which Board members considered sufficiently in bad taste to
justify its removal. The offending essay was entitled A Modest Proposalfor
Preventing the Children of Poor People of Irelandfrom Being a Burden to Their
'Parentsor Country by Jonathan Swift. Swift suggested in great detail how the
overpopulation problem could be solved by having 100,000, one-year old children
slaughtered and served as food, with the skins to be artificially dressed and made
into boots. 638 F.2d at 428 n.6 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
18. The removed books were in fact placed on display for public inspection at
the local public library. 102 S. Ct. at 2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

in school libraries, where they are so easily accessable to children whose
minds are still in the formulative stage, and their presence actually entices children to read and savor them.
We who are elected by the community, are the eyes and ears of the parents. It is our duty, our moral obligation, to protect the children in our
schools from this moral danger as surely as from physical and medical
dangers. 19
On March 30, 1976, the Board ratified the already accomplished
book removal and appointed a "Book Review Committee" 20 to advise the Board on whether the books should have been retained,

"taking into account the books 'educational suitability,' 'good
taste,' and 'appropriateness to age and grade level."21 After reviewing the books, the committee recommended that four books
be retained on the school library shelves, 2 2 two books be made
available to students subject to parental approval, 23 and two
books be permanently removed. 24 Of the remaining three books,
the committee could not agree on two,25 and took no action on one
because not all of the members read it.26 On July 28, 1976, the

Board, however, substantially rejected the committee's report by
ordering one book returned to the high school library without restriction, 27 one book made available to students subject to paren-

tal approval, 28

and the remaining nine books removed

permanently from the school libraries and curricula. 29 The Board

gave no explanation for rejecting the committee's recommendations.

30

19. 474 F. Supp. at 390 (footnotes added).
20. The committee consisted of four Island Trees parents and four staff members not including any librarians. Id. at 391.
21. 102 S. Ct. at 2803.
22. 474 F. Supp. at 391 & n.7. The books retained were LAUGHING Boy, BLACK
Boy, Go ASK ALICE and BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS. The plurality

opinion stated THE FIXER was also returned to the shelf. 102 S.Ct. at 2803 & n.5.
The district court opinion, however, stated the committee recommended THE
FmXER should be returned to the library and curriculum on the condition that students' access to the books be subject to parental approval. 474 F. Supp. at 391 &
n.6.

.

23. 474 F. Supp. at 391 &nn.6 & 10. The books available upon parental approval

were THE FIXER and SLAUGHTER HOUSE FIVE.

24. Id. at 391 & n.8. The books removed were THE NAKED APE and DOWN
THESE MEAN STREETS.

25. Id. at 391 & n.9. These books were SOUL ON ICE and A HERO AINr NoTHIN'
BUT A SANDWICH.
26. Id. at 392 & n.11. No action was taken on A READER FOR WRITERS.

27. Id. at 391 & n.12. The returned book was LAUGHING BOY.
28. Id. at 391 & n.13. The resticted book was BLACK Boy.

29. Id. at 391.
30. 102 S.Ct. at 2803. One Board member, in an affidavit, stated in part his
personal motivation for removing the books:
I am basically a conservative in my general philosophy and feel that the
community I represent as a school board member shares that philosophy
.... I feel that it is my duty to apply my conservative principles to the
decision making process in which I am involved as a board member and I
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In January 1977, four high school students and one junior high
school student 3 ifiled an action against the School Board under 42
U.S.C. section 1983,32 alleging the School Board had denied the
students their first amendment rights.3 3 The students requested
that the district court declare the Board's removal of the books
unconstitutional and sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief ordering the Board to return the books to the school libraries and to refrain from interfering with the use of the books
in the school curriculum. 34
have done so with regard to fiscal matters, student discipline, teacher performance, union negotiations, curriculum formation and content and other
educational matters.
My objection is to the obscenity and bad taste contained in [the books]
as well as their irrelevance, in my opinion, to the basic curriculum of the
district and to the values which I, as a board member and president, feel
the community wishes inculcated in its youth .... A review of these
materials ... will indicate that the excerpts about which we were concerned . .. contain every form of obscenity and sexual allusion imaginable [sic]. Granted one ... also makes ridiculous and disparaging
remarks about Christ and one.., about Jews. This does not mean that
my objection is based on religious grounds or a desire to favor or exclude
one religion over another. I just plain think it is in terrible taste and irrelevant to the educational process in my district- not to mention being obscene.
These students do not have the same right to be exposed to obscenities
as an adult. I will certainly not be an instrument of it. If they wish to read
the "banned" books they are welcome to while not in school as long as
their parents do not object. Most of these volumes are in the public library so there are alternative sources. As long as I have the legal right to
exercise my discretion in the way I have, I shall continue to do so. This is
the essence of the concept of community standards and local control of
school boards.
474 F. Supp. at 391-92.
Coincidentally, at the same time as the book committee banned the books, two
incumbent members of the Board ran for re-election. According to one Board
member, the "'book banning issue was the major one in the campaign. Nevertheless, the incumbent members were re-elected."' 638 F.2d at 411.
31. 102 S. Ct. at 2802.
32. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1I 1979).
33. The first amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. 102 S.Ct. at 2804.

III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The discussion of any case involving the educational system
must begin with the recognition that courts, under a number of
theories, have traditionally given the state and local school authorities broad discretionary powers in all matters affecting the
educational process. 35 Currently, the courts defer to school au-

thorities under a theory known as the inculcativefunction of education.36 Under this theory, education's purpose is to instill in
students basic concepts, skills, values and knowledge which the
community considers "necessary to function in our society ...
and 'o... maint[ain] [our] democratic political system.' "37 Fur-

thermore, "[j] udges rarely are as competent as school authorities
to make ... decisions" concerning which values should be
35. One early theory used by courts to defer to state and local school administrators was in loco parentis, which Blackstone defined in his COMMENTARIES.
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis,
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge,
viz: that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the
purpose for which he is employed.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453. See, e.g., Richards v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142,
145-46, 249 N.W. 557, 559 (1933) (parents of high school students could not enjoin
school board's decision to create "one-session school," prohibiting students from
leaving school grounds during lunch hour because school board's authority over
control of pupils during school hours is subject only to due process restraints).
See generally Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Non-ConstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L.
REv. 373, 377-384 (1969).
The doctrine of in loco parentis, however, has largely
been abandoned by the courts. See, e.g., Zander v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 F.
Supp. 747, 756 (W.D. La. 1968) (theory of in loco parentis found to be "of little use"
when dealing with modern student problems). Nevertheless, one board member
invoked the language in loco parentis to support the removal of the books. See
supra note 30.
Another early theory used by courts was to treat school attendance as a privilege which was conditioned upon the waiver of the students' consitutional rights
and liberties. In Board of Trustees v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623, 62 So. 827 (1914), afd
237 U.S. 589 (1915), the court stated that "[t]he right to attend the educational institutions of the state... is a gift .... If a person seeks to become a beneficiary of
this gift, he must submit to such conditions as the law imposes as a condition precedent to this right." Id. at 633-34, 62 So. at 930-31. See generally Developments in
the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1045 (1968). The privilege theory,
however, has also virtually disappeared and has also been expressly rejected.
E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2
(1969) (first amendment prohibited suspension of public school students who
wore black armbands protesting Vietnam War).
36. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2806 (1982) ("IPlublic schools
are vitally important 'in preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,'
and as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system.'" (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77
(1979)).
37. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2832 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). See generally Goldstein,
The Asserted ConstitutionalRight of Public School Teachers to Determine What
They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. Rav. 1293 (1976).

550
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inculcated. 38
The Court, nevertheless, has intervened in the education system in a few instances. The Court's first intervention into the
education field was in Meyer v. Nebraska,39 where the Court
struck down, as violative of substantive due process, a statute
prohibiting the teaching of modern foreign languages to students
who had not passed the eighth grade. 40 Although the Court appreciated the statute's purpose 41 of promoting the student's civic
development and indoctrinating the students in American ideals, 42 the Court held that the statute violated the teacher's right to

engage in his chosen profession, 43 the parents' right to control
their children's education," and the students' right to acquire
45
knowledge.
Meyer is significant for two reasons. First, it established that
state and local control of education was not absolute, in that
school officials may not violate teachers', parents' and students'
constitutional rights.46 The precedential value of Meyer in this respect, however, is limited by two factors: Meyer involved a private school 47 in which the state had little interest in how
resources were spent, and the Meyer Court relied on substantive
due process48 which the Court later rejected in cases involving
38. 102 S. Ct. at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting). This theory, however, is not without its detractors who believe that such education turns the students and teachers
into almost automatons. The teacher, rather than striving to create new truths,
merely conveys information and accepted truths to theoretically passive and absorbent students. See also Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd.
No. 25, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (denying certiorari) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Students Rights,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, 614 (1970).
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. Id. at 400-01.
41. Id. at 402.
42. Id. at 401.
43. Id. at 400.
44. Id. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
45. 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). The decision was based on the Court's holding
that these liberties were guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment due process
clause, the statute impinged on these rights, and the statute was arbitrary and
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state. Id. at
400-02.
46. 'That the state may do much, go very far, indeed in order to improve the
quality of its citizens, physically, mentally, and morally, is clear but the individual
has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the
Constitution extends to all ... 262 U.S. at 401.
47. 262 U.S. at 396.
48. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

students' rights.49
Second, Meyer is important for holding that parents' rights to
control the upbringing of their children was protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Although the use of substantive due process has largely been abandoned by the Court,5 0
in a limited class of cases involving governmental interference
into family relationships, the Court has continued to use substantive due process to invalidate certain government actions.5 1 For
example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 2 the Court held that an
Oregon statute prohibiting private schooling of children between
the ages of eight and sixteen abridged the parents' right to guide
their children's intellectual and religious upbringing. The Court
3
used this parental rights argument again in Wisconsin v. Yoder5
to hold a compulsory school attendance law requiring children to
attend a public school between the ages of seven and sixteen unconstitutional as applied to Amish parents. In Pierce54 and
Yoder, 55 however, the Court warned that the parental right to
control the upbringing of one's children was not absolute. Where
the parents' interest involves the general education of the children, the school system may act "reasonably" in educating the
children without interfering with the parents' rights.56 Accordingly, in Davis v. Page,57 the school's use of audio visual equip-

ment did not violate apostolic Lutheran parent's rights to control
the education of their children.
The Court's next important intervention into the public school
49. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For further discussion of Barnette, see infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(first amendment issues were stressed); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
(substantive due process challenge on economic grounds dismissed).

51. The Court's use of substantive due process in family relationship cases
has extended beyond the area of education. For example, in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Court struck down a zoning ordinance which limited
occupancy of a dwelling to members of a single family (narrowly defined to include only a few categories of related individuals) as violative of the family right
to choose with which relatives the family wishes to live. In Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978), a Wisconsin statute requiring any resident having children not
in his custody and for which he owes a legal obligation of support to obtain court
approval to marry was invalidated by the Court, because it abridged the fundamental right to marry. In Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), the Court
struck down a New York provision permitting the terp-nnation of parental rights in
natural children upon a finding, by a fair preponderence of the evidence, that the
child was permanently neglected as violative of the fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody and management of their children.
52. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
53. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
54. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
55. 406 U.S. at 233-34.
56. Id. at 233.
57. 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
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system came in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 58 where the Court held that flag salutes in public schools violated the students' first amendment rights. 59 The Court stated
that "freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship . . . [were] susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully
protect." 60 The Court noted, however, that where no first amendment rights were involved, school authorities could impose any
regulation which had a "rational basis" for adoption. 61 In summary, the Court in Barnette held that intervention into the public
school system was dependent upon whether specific constitutional rights were at issue.
The landmark case in the area of students' rights is Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District.62 The Court
in Tinker invalidated a public school regulation which forbade
students from wearing black armbands to silently protest the war
in Vietnam. The Court stated that students had the right of freedom of expression provided they did so without "'materially and
substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding
with the rights of others." 63 Tinker, therefore, provided a test to
weigh the rights of the students against valid school interests. 64
This brief sketch of the development of students' rights was not
intended to define the nature of those rights. Rather, its purpose
was to indicate the judiciary's role in protecting those rights. This
role was best summarized in Epperson v. Arkansas65 where the
58. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (the action was brought by Jehovah's Witnesses whose
children refused to salute the flag on the grounds it violated their religious
beliefs).
59. Id. at 642.
60. Id. at 639.
61. Id. The Court did not mean, however, that it would ignore other specific
constitutional guarantees. The Court has, in fact, struck down laws which deny
students their fourteenth amendment right to equal protection (Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) and procedural due process (Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975)).
62. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See generally Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to Schoo4 38 FoRDHiAm L REV. 35 (1969); Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The
High School as an EducationalPublic Forum, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L L. REv. 278 (1970).
63. 393 U.S. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
64. For a discussion of the subsequent judicial interpretations and applications of the Tinker standard, see Garvey, Children and the First Amendmen 57
Tzx. L. REV. 321 (1979).

65. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Epperson, the Court struck down a statute which
made it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university to teach

Court stated:
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the
Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. Our courts, however,
have not failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief. By and large, public education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.
Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which
arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly
66
and sharply implicate basic constitutionalvalues.

IV.

PICo IN THE LOWER COURTS

In Pico v. Board of Education,67 the district court granted the
School Board's motion for summary judgment against the students' claim that the Board's removal of books from the library violated their constitutional rights.6 8 In holding that the removal of
shelved books from a public school library failed to raise a consitutional issue,6 9 the district court adopted, in toto, the reasoning
of a previous book removal case, Presidents Council v. Community
School Board.70 In Presidents Council, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found no constitutional issue raised by the removal of library books by the school board, because the board's
action did not prevent the book, or its subject matter, from being
discussed in the classroom. The removal neither prevented the
teacher from assigning the book as outside reading, nor the student from reading it at his own expense or with parental permission.7 1 The Second Circuit rejected the students' argument that a
constitutional issue had been raised because the removed book
had once been shelved, describing it as "novel and unsupportable
under any theory of constitutional law [the court could] disor use a textbook which taught the evolutionary theory of creation. The Court
held that the first amendment did not allow a state to require teaching or learning
tailored by the principles or prohibitions of a religious sect or dogma.
66. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
67. 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 102
S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
68. For factual background of the case, see supra notes 5-35 and accompanying
text.

69. 474 F. Supp. at 395.
70. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).

The school board

voted to remove all copies of DowN THESE MEAN STREETS by Piri Thomas from the
junior high school libraries in the district. The board later made the book available on a direct loan basis to parents and students. Objecting parents claimed the
book's obscenities and graphic depictions of sex, violence, and drug encounters
would have an adverse moral and psychological effect on the students. Students
asserted that in addition to its literary value, the book was valuable in acquainting
the predominantly white, middle-class students of Queens to life in Spanish Harlem. Id. at 290-91.
71. Id. at 291-92.
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cover."72 The court stated that because state statute granted the
school board the power to select the books initially by state statute,73 that same body had the power to remove books which had
become obsolete or irrelevant or were improperly selected.7 4 The
district court intimated, however, that a constitutional issue
would have been raised had the School Board's actions involved a
religious question, 75 banned the teaching of a particular theory or
doctrine, 76 or denied the students their freedom of expression.77
The district court then addressed recent decisions78 which had
held that book removals did violate students' constitutional rights.
The district court found these cases unpersuasive because they
72. Id. at 293.
73. Id. at 290.
74. Id. at 291.
75. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
76. E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). For a discussion of Epperson, see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
77. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969). See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
78. In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976),
the school board prohibited CAT'S CRADLE and GOD BLESS YOU, MR.ROSEWATER
by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. and CATcH-22 by Joseph Heller from being used by or read
in schools; Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Maine 1982),
the school committee removed 365 DAYS, a compilation of nonfictional Vietnam
War stories by American combat soldiers, because the book contained, in the
words of one counsel, "f,".. s,""p" and "b" words and profane uses of "Jesus
Christ" and "God." At the time the initial ban was imposed, none of the committee members had read the book, and only three of the five members had read it
before the final action was taken. In Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp.
1269 (D.N.H. 1979), the school board withdrew from the high school library all copies of Ms. magazine and cancelled the subscription because the periodical contained advertisements for vibrators, contraceptives, lesbian materials, a procommunist newspaper and trips to Cuba. Not all of the board members had read
the offending magazine at the time of the board's action, because the women
members were sheltered from the "improper material." The court, noting that
other library materials, such as Redbook, Mademoiselle, and Family Health, were
not subject to the Board's attack even though they also contained articles on sex
and contraceptives and advertisements for bust developers, contraceptives and
vibrators, concluded that it was the political content of Ms. magazine more than
the sexual overtones which led to its removal; In Right to Read Defense Comm. v.
School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), the school committee removed
from high school library an anthology of writings by adolescents entitled MALE
AND FEMALE UNDER 18 after one objecting parent found one of the poems in the
anthology to contain vulgar language and sexual overtones.
These decisions held that although neither the state nor the school board was
required by the first amendment to provide a high school library, once the library
was created, the students' constitutional interest in its operation must be
respected. Once a book has been shelved, the students' consitutional right to receive ideas is violated if the school board removes it for constitutionally impermis-

merely adopted the distinction between shelved and unshelved
books which the Court in Presidents Council had correctly rejected.79 Noting that indoctrination was a principle function of
public schools,80 the district court stated the book tenure approach impinged upon the elected School Board's statutory grant
of discretionary power to determine which community values to
transmit. 81 Furthermore, the reasoning behind the other decisions was not logically or constitutionally limited to book removals. 82 When funds and space were available, federal courts would
be required to pass upon a school board's content-based refusal
to acquire a book upon a student's request.8 3 This situation
would result in federal courts, rather than school boards, determining which books a school district should acquire. 84
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment.8 5 In the opinion announcing the
judgment of the court,8 6 Judge Sifton stated freedom of expression, the right at stake in book removal cases, required "breathing
room," 87 because official determinations of what may or may not

be read has a "chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First
Amendment rights."88 Noting the competing interests and rights
sible reasons. See iqfra notes 168-87 and accompanying text for discussion of the
right to receive ideas.
In Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Dist. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980)
the school board voted to remove and destroy the textbook VALUE CLARIFICATION,
by J. Doyle Casteel-the textbooks were publicly burned by a senior citizen organization-and remove GROWING Up FEMALE IN AMERICA, by Eve Merriam, ed.; Go
AsK ALICE, by Anonymous; THE BELL JAR, by Sylvia Plath; and STEPFORD WrVES,
by Ira Levin from the library and curriculum. In Zykan, which was decided after
the district court decision in Pico, the court of appeals took a somewhat different
approach from the right to receive decisions by holding that the interest at stake
was the right to academic freedom. This freedom, however, had to be weighed
against the secondary school's inculcative function. In weighing the competing interests, the court held that the former outweighed the latter only when the school
officials imposed an exclusive ideological orthodoxy upon the students that bordered on establishing a religion or permanently hindering the student's future
ability to participate in the marketplace of ideas. Because no such allegations
were made by the plaintiffs, the book removals were upheld.
79. 474 F. Supp. at 395.
80. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
81. 474 F. Supp. at 396.
82. Id. at 397.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 102 S. Ct. 2799
(1982).
86. There was no opinion of the court, because the two judges who concurred
in the judgment, Sifton and Newman, did so based upon different reasoning, and
one judge, Mansfield, dissented from the judgment.
87. 638 F.2d at 413 (quoting James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972)).
88. 638 F.2d at 413 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604
(1976)).
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involved in book removal cases, 89 Judge Sifton held that only removal of controversial books under procedurally irregular circumstances had that degree of "chilling effect" which would result in
violation of the students' constitutional freedom of expression.9 0
Once the students had established the prima facie case, as the
students had in Pico, the burden of persuasion shifted to the
Board to demonstrate that its actions had a reasonable basis, 91
were procedurally regular, 92 and did not burden free expression
any more than was necessary to further the substantial government interests.9 3 Because the Board failed to meet this burden in
the pleadings, summary judgment was found to have been improperly granted.9 4
Judge Newman concurred in the judgment, but his reasoning
differed significantly from Judge Sifton's. Judge Newman began
with the premise that the expression of ideas was the constitutional right involved 95 and its prohibition was the most obnoxious
violation of the first amendment.9 6
Although the singling out of a certain type of speech for special
treatment is usually sufficient to render the state's action impermissible, Judge Newman recognized that special interests unique
to school systems require courts to give school officials more latitude in such matters.9 7 However, when the disapproval is political in nature, as was alleged in Pico, this deferential treatment
ends.98 Judge Newman concluded that because the students' alle89. For example, Judge Sifton cited as some of the competing interest brought
into conflict in a book removal case the government's role in protecting youth, the

school's role in indoctrinating students with the community's values, the belief
that schools should be under the control of state and local authorities, and the
students' first amendment rights. 638 F.2d at 412-13.
90. 638 F.2d at 413-14. Judge Sifton distinguished Presidents Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), on the

basis of this test. Although Judge Sifton did not specifically address the facts of
Presidents Council, he maintained that it only involved a removal of a controversial book and did not meet the requirements of a primafacie case. 638 F.2d at 414.
91. 638 F.2d at 414. For instance, Judge Sifton listed prevention of classroom
disruption and disorder, protection of rights of others (including the regulation of
language to protect the psychological well-being of the young) and promotion of
civility and decency among school children. Id. at 415.
92. 638 F.2d at 417.
93. Id. at 415-16.
94. Id. at 418.
95. 638 F.2d at 432 (Newman, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 433.
97. 638 F.2d at 434.
98. Id.

gations pointed to School Board actions motivated by politics,
summary judgment was improper. 99 The Board should have been
required to prove at trial that it was not motivated by political beliefs but rather by concerns properly within its sphere-protecting students from vulgar language and explicit sexual
descriptions. 100
Judge Mansfield dissented from the court's reversal of summary judgment, 10 1 stating that the Board's action did not venture
into the constitutionally impermissible areas of destroying or hindering any student's right to free expression, inculcating students
with a particular social or political view to the exclusion of others,
or forcing the students to speak against their free will.102 To the
contrary, the Board's action merely discontinued a handfull of
books with either vulgar and indecent langage, profanities, explicit sex, poor grammar, glorification of sex and drugs, or antiJewish, anti-black, or anti-Christian remarks. 0 3 Finding no constitutional issue, Judge Mansfield would have affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment. 0 4
VI. PIco IN THE SUPREME COURT

By the time the Supreme Court handed down its decision, similar cases in the lower courts had yielded basically three different
theories with which to evaluate the issue; each theory was subject
to great variations. First, a few judges opined that the act of a
school board removing a book from a public school library did not
raise a constitutional question. 0 5 Second, a number of opinions
99. Id. at 436.
100. 638 F.2d at 417. On the day Pico was decided, the same panel of judges decided another book removal case, Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of
Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (school board used an elaborate written policy governing selection and removal of books to remove DOG DAY AFrERNOON by
Patrick Mann and THE WANDERERS by Richard Price from high school library because of vulgar and indecent langage).
Two courts have disagreed with Judge Sifton's opinion that protecting students
from vulgar language is a valid reason for removing books from school libraries.
Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 520 F. Supp. 679, 687 (D. Maine 1982) (school
library books could only be removed on obscenity grounds if they lacked serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value and appealed to the prurient interest
in sex); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 713-14
(D. Mass. 1978) (desire to protect students from objectionable, but not obscene,
language was not a substantial and legitimate government interest which would
permit school board to remove school library books).
101. 638 F.2d at 419 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 428.
103. Id. at 427-28.
104. Id. at 432. Judge Mansfield also concurred in Bicknell v. Vergennes Union
High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1980), see supra note 100, on
the grounds stated in Pico.
105. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d at 442
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found that the removal of a book violated the students' rights to
receive ideas.106 Third, a number of greatly varying opinions were
07
based upon variations of the general right to free expression.
Much like the lower courts, the Supreme Court's handling of the
issue of book removals also resulted in three different answers.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
wrote the plurality opinion which joined those decisions in the
second category of cases l08 in holding the School Board's removal
of library books violated the students' first amendment right to receive ideas. 10 9 Justice Brennan began by noting three factors
which delineated the questions represented. First, because only
library books, and not textbooks or required reading were at issue, the case only involved judicial intervention into the library;
therefore, the "difficult terrain" of judicial intervention into the
classroom or curriculum was avoided.110 Second, the action did
not concern the acquisition of books, only the removal of books
originally placed in the school libraries by school authorities."'
Third, because the case reached the Court after a summary judgment motion was granted, the School Board could have been successful on appeal only if "'there [were] no genuine issue as to
(Mansfield, J., concurring), see supra note 104; Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d at
419, afd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982) (Mansfield, J.,dissenting), see supra notes 101-04
and accompanying text; Presidents Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying
text; Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404
(2d cir. 1980), affd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982), see supra notes 67-84 and accompanying
text.
106. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577(6th Cir. 1976), see
supra note 78; Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979), see
supra note 78; Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. (D.
Mass. 1978), see supra note 78; Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679
(D. Maine 1972), see supra note 78.
107. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir. 1981), see supra note 100; Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980),
affd 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982), see supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text; Pico v.
Board of Educ., 638 F.2d at 432 (Newman, J., concurring), see supra notes 95-100
and accompanying text; Zykan v. Warsaw Comm. School Dist. Corp., 631 F.2d 100
(7th Cir. 1980), see supra note 78.
108. See supra note 106.
109. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2797, 2807-08 (1982).
110. Id. at 2805. Justice Brennan cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
see supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text, and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968), see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text, as examples where the
Court intervened into the classroom or curriculum with "apparent misgivings."
102 S. Ct. at 2805.
111. 102 S. Ct. at 2805-06.

any material fact,' and ... [the School Board was] 'entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.' 112 Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded there were two issues presented to the Court: one,
whether the first amendment limited the School Board's discretion in removing library books and two, if so, whether the evidence raised any issue of material fact as to whether the Board's
3
actions exceeded those first amendment limitations."
In answering the first question, Justice Brennan stated the constitutional right involved in book removal cases was the right to
receive ideas." 4 Justice Brennan recognized, however, that this
right, like all constitutional rights afforded to students, had to be
"construed 'in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.' "115 Traditionally, this has meant that school authorities would be given broad power over all educational matters.
Justice Brennan, however, invoked the distinction between the library and the classroom curriculum to turn the limitation on students' rights into a tool for expansion of those rights. Justice
Brennan characterized school libraries as "'a place dedicated to
quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty"'11 6 where "'students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding.' "117 To Justice Brennan, the school
library was "the principle locus" of the right to receive ideas." 8
Admitting that the School Board may have had absolute discretion in determining which values to transmit in the classroom in
discharge of its inculcative function, Justice Brennan did not
think the School Board was so unfettered in its use of discretion
in the school library where the "regime of voluntary inquiry
... [held] sway." 1 9 Therefore, the plurality answered the first
question presented in the case 20 by holding that the School
Board's power to remove library books was limited by the first
amendment.
121
In order to answer the second question raised by the case,
Justice Brennan had to determine what limitations the first
112. Id. at 2806 (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 56 (c)).

113. 102 S. Ct. at 2806.
114. Id. at 2807-09. See infra notes 168-87 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 2806 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
383 U.S. 503, 506 (1968)).
116. 102 S.Ct. at 2808.09 (quoting Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966)
(opinion of Fortas, J.)).
117. 102 S.Ct. at 2809 (footnote omitted) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S 589, 603 (1967)).
118. 102 S.Ct. at 2809.
119. Id.
120. The first question was whether the first amendment limited the School
Board's removing of library books. 102 S.Ct. at 2806.
121. The second question was whether the evidence raised any issue of mate-
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amendment placed on the School Board in removing books from
its libraries.1 22 The plurality opinion drew on several previous decisions including Barnette,123 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 124
and Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 125 to conclude
the School Board violated the students' first amendment right to
receive ideas if a decisive factor in the Board's decision was to intend to deny students access to ideas with which the Board disagreed.126 On the other hand, no constitutional issue was raised if
the Board was motivated to remove the books because they were

"pervasively vulgar" or "educationally unsuitable."127

Having established this test, Justice Brennan applied it to the
facts of this case and found that a genuine issue of fact existed as
to whether the School Board exceeded the constitutional limits in
its use of its discretionary power to remove the books.128 Justice
Brennan referred to the students' allegations that the School
Board based its decision to remove the books on its members'
"personal values, morals and tastes," that excerpts from them
were "anti-American," and the Board's failure to use established,
regular, and facially unbiased procedures for the review of the
books, in concluding that a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the Board's actions violated the students' first amendrial fact as to whether the Board's actions exceeded first amendment limitations.
Id.
122. 102 S. Ct. at 2809.
123. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion .... If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
Id. at 624. For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying
text.
124. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). "[T]he First Amendment . . .does not tolerate laws
which cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." Id. at 603. The Keyishian
Court struck down a Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York
requirement that each faculty member certify he was not a member of the Communist Party, as violative of the faculty member's first amendment rights.
125. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, an untenured teacher whose contract
was not renewed by the school board invoked the protection of the first amendment, claiming the underlying reason for his nonrenewal was his exercise of his
constitutional rights. The Mt. Healthy Court remanded the case for further review
noting that the teacher's claim was valid "if the decision not to rehire him was
made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment
freedoms" despite the fact he had no constitutional right to renewal. Id. at 283-84.
126. 102 S.Ct. at 2810.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2811.

ment rights. 129 Therefore, summary judgment was improperly
30
granted.l
Justice Blackmun concurred with the plurality concerning the
test to be used in determining the constitutionality of removal of
library books by school boards, 131 but disagreed with the plurality
on the nature of the first amendment right violated. 3 2 Justice
Blackmun joined the opinions in the third category of cases' 3 3 in
holding the right violated by the removal of a library book by a
school board was a violation of the freedom of expression. Specifically, Justice Blackmun believed that the constitutional principle
at stake in book removal cases was that a state may not suppress
exposure to ideas. 3 4 In other words, "the State may not act to
deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of
35
that idea for partisan ideas."'

According to Justice Blackmun, this principle is narrower than
the right to receive ideas, from which an affirmative obligation to
provide students with ideas may be inferred.136 The difference
between the two principles is that while the right to receive ideas,
as interpreted by the plurality, focuses on the failure to provide
information, Justice Blackmun's principle that a state may not
suppress exposure to ideas centers on "the State's decision to single out an idea for disapproval and then deny access to it."137
This principle, according to Justice Blackmun, would permit
school officials to choose one book over another without judicial
intervention when one book is deemed more relevant to the curriculum or better written than the other, or when one book's subject matter is considered more important or more deserving of
emphasis than the second book's subject matter.138 On the other
hand, the principle would allow a school board to refuse to make
available a book on the basis of content alone when the book contains offensive language, is "psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for the age group," or advances ideas "'manifestly
inimical to the public welfare.'

"139

Justice White also concurred in the judgment stating that the
129. Id. at 2811-12.
130. Id. at 2812.
131. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
132. 102 S. Ct. 2812 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
133. See supra note 106.
134. 102 S. Ct. at 2813 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2814.
136. Id. at 2813-14.
137. Id. at 2814, n.2.
138. Id. at 2815.
139. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) and FCC v.
Paciflca Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978)).
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unresolved factual issue, the reason or reasons underlying the
School Board's removal of the library books, precluded summary
judgment1 40 Having held summary judgment improperly
granted, Justice White thought it unnecessary to discuss the constitutional issues involved. Only if trial were held, an appeal were
taken and certiorari were granted should the Court address the
constitutional issues raised by the case.1 41 Therefore, by voting to
reverse the summary judgment, Justice White held the first
amendment limited the School Board's power to remove books
from the school library.
Chief Justice Burger dissented in an opinion joined by Justices
Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. 42 The thrust of the dissent was
that the Board's removal of the books violated no constitutional
right previously recognized by the Court.'4 3 Although Chief Justice Burger agreed there was a constitutional right to receive
ideas, he stated that the right only prevented the government
from imposing unreasonable obstacles to dissemination by willing
distributors; it did not require the government to affirmatively aid
the speaker in reaching the recipient.'" Chief Justice Burger
stated that not only did the School Board's removal of the books
for content-based reasons not violate the Constitution, contentbased decisions were necessarily required for the Board to perform its legitimate function of "inculcating fundamental values
45
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."
If the Board errs in determining which values are to be transmitted in what manner, then it is up to the voters and parents to rectify the situation by removing the Board members or by acquiring
the books for their children through alternative sources. 4 6
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, a former school board
member,147 expressed his faith and belief in local school boards
and lamented the effect of the plurality's decision on school sys140. 102 S. Ct. at 2816 (White, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. 102 S. Ct. at 2817 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2817-18.
144. Id. For a discussion of the right to receive information, see infra notes 16889 and accompanying text.
145. Id. at 2819, (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
146. 102 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
147. Justice Powell was president of the Richmond School Board and a member and president of the Virginia State Board of Education. CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, INC., GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 865 (1979).

tems. 148 According to Justice Powell, school boards were
''uniquely local and democratic institutions" which were "closer
to the people whom [they] serve[d]" than any other single government agency.149 Justice Powell feared that suits like this,
whatever the outcome, would expose school board members to
liability, require educational policy to be determined by litigation,
and undermine the school board's authority and effectiveness. 5 0
Justice Powell concluded that the decision "symboliz[ed] a
debilitating encroachment upon the institution of a free
5
people."l l

Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, an exhaustive critique
of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion,152 concluded that the right
Justice Brennan declared to have been violated by the removal of
library books by a school board was wholly unsupported by the
Court's past decisions and inconsistent with the function of elementary and secondary education. 5 3 Justice Rehnquist believed
a distinction had to be drawn between the state as a sovereign
and the state as an educator.15 4 According to Justice Rehnquist,
actions by the state as educator do not raise the same first
amendment issues as actions by the state as sovereign. 5 5 A town
council acting in its sovereign capacity could not constitutionally
prohibit the sale of the books in question by private booksellers
within the municipality.156 On the other hand, when the state
acts as educator, one of its functions is to "inculcatle] social values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people."l5 7
In performing this inculcative function, the school board members
must "'make educational decisions based upon their personal social, political and moral views.' "158
148. 102 S. Ct. at 2822.23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 2822.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 2823.
152. 102 S. Ct. at 2827-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell.

153. Id. at 2830.
154. Id. at 2829. Justice Rehnquist relied on Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1967), to support his argument that the protection afforded by the first amend-

ment depends on the role in which the state is acting. In Adderley, the Court upheld a state prohibition of expressive conduct on the state correctional facility
grounds. Justice Rehnquist quoted the Adderley Court statement that "'Ithe
state, no less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."' 102 S. Ct. at
2829 (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. at 47).
155. 102 S. Ct at 2830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 2829.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2830 (quoting Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d
1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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Justice O'Connor, in a brief dissent, stated that a school board,
which has the power to set curriculum, select teachers, and determine what books to purchase for the school library, also has the
power to remove library books.159 Justice O'Connor noted, however, that school boards could not interfere with the students'
right to read the material or to discuss it.160
VIL

ANALYSIS

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,161 the Court set out the analytical framework upon which
cases concerning student rights were to be decided when it
stated, "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment [were] available to
teachers and students. ' 162 Accordingly, in book removal cases
such as Board of Education v. Pico,1 63

three questions are

presented. First, whether the removal of a library book by a
school board for content-based reasons violates students' first
amendment rights. Second, whether there are any state interests
which justify the school board's violating the students' rights. Although the case can be decided by answering the above two questions, a third question should also be addressed, namely whether
there are any restrictions on school board power to remove books
for content-based reasons. Therefore, each of the decisions in
Pico must be analyzed in relation to how it addressed the above
questions.
A.

Whether the Students' FirstAmendment Rights Were Violated
by a Removal of a Book by the School Boardfor
Content-Based Reasons.

In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan answered this first
question in the affirmative.1 64 Justice Brennan supported this
declaration by quoting a few phrases from previous first amendment cases 1 6 and by stating that the right to receive ideas was
159. 102 S. Ct. at 2835 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
162. 393 U.S. at 506.
163. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
164. Id. at 2807-08.
165. E.g., "Our precedents have focused 'not only on the role of the First
Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording

necessary for the recipient to meaningfully exercise his own first
amendment rights. 16 6 Justice Brennan concluded by stating "just
as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens generally to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful manner,

such access prepares students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which they will
soon be adult members." 167 Although one may agree with Justice
Brennan's conclusion, the Justice, nevertheless, fails to discuss
the nature and scope of the right to receive ideas and how it is
violated by a school board's removal of a library book. Therefore,
the nature and scope of this right must be examined here.
The right to receive ideas is not expressly stated in the Constitution. The Court, however, as early as 1936, has noted the public
has an interest which flows from the first amendment in acquiring
information. 168 In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 169 the Court
declared a newspaper license tax unconstitutional, because the
tax was seen as a "deliberate and calculated device in the guise of
a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public
0
[was] entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties."17
The Court again alluded to the right to receive ideas on a
number of times in dicta in the 1940's.171 The clearest statement
of this right came in Martin v. Struthers,172 where the Court invalthe public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas.'" 102 S. Ct. at 2808 (quoting First Natil. Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S.
765, 783 (1978)); "The right of freedom of speech and press ... embraces the right
to distribute literature, . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it.'" 102
S. Ct at 2808, (quoting Martin v. Struthers, 318 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)) (citation omitted); "'he
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.'" 102 S. Ct. at 2808
(quoting Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
166. 102 S. Ct. at 2808.
167. Id.
168. See generally Comment, The Right to Know and School Board Censorship
of High School Book Acquisitions, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1115, 1129-30 (1977) (the
theoretical basis of the right to know and its effect on the right's scope); Case
Comment, Right to Read Defense Committee of Chelsea v. School Committee of the
City of Chelsea: The First Amendment Comes Off the Shelf, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv.
288, 306-09 (1978) (right to know based on the marketplace concept and control of
students' moral development); Note, The Right to Know in FirstAmendment Analysis, 57 TEx. L. REV. 506-07 (1979) (intent of framers, first amendment values as
bases for right to know); Note, The ConstitutionalRight to Know, 4 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 109, 114-135 (1977) (foundations of right to know).
169. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
170. Id. at 250.
171. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (company town could
not prohibit distribution of religious literature on sidewalk of company-owned
town); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945) (workers had right to hear proposals of union organizer).
172. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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idated a local ordinance which prohibited door-to-door distribution of handbills as applied to religious organizations. 1 73 In
holding the ordinance violated the first amendment freedoms of
speech and press, the Court added "[t]he right of freedom of
speech and press . . . embraces the right to distribute literature
...and necessarily protects the right to receive it."'174
In a series of cases beginning in the 1960's the Court began to
expressly protect the right to receive ideas. In the first case, Lamont v. Postmaster General,175 the Court invalidated a statute
which required the Postmaster General to detain and deliver only
upon the addressee's request unsealed foreign mailings of communist political propaganda, because it required "an official act
...as a limitation on the unfettered exercise of the addressee's
First Amendment rights.176 In Kleindienst v. Mandel,177 the
Court upheld the power of Congress and the Executive Branch to
prevent the entry into this country of a Marxist theoretician who
had been invited to lecture at an American university, despite the
first amendment rights of citizens who wished to hear him. In
Procunierv. Martinez,178 the Court discussed the right to receive
ideas in striking down a California Department of Corrections
regulation permitting prison officials to censor prisoner's mail.
The Court stated, "the addressee as well as the sender of direct
personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth
Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental inter79
ference with the intended communication."'
The right to receive ideas, however, was not fully recognized
until Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 180 There, the Court struck down a Virginia
statute which prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising
the prices of prescription drugs.181 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy was an important step in the development of the right to re173. Id. at 149.
174. Id. at 143. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
175. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
176. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
177. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
178. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
179. Id. at 408-09.
180. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
181. Id. at 773. The case is primarily noted for its holding that commercial
speech is not entirely removed from first amendment protection. Id. at 762. See
generally Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial Expression, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 761 (1976).

ceive information, because it held prospective recipients of the
prohibited communication had standing to challenge the state ac182
tions on first amendment grounds.
The above cases, cited by Justice Brennan, 183 are commonly
cited as being among the line of cases which established the right
to receive ideas.18 4 All of the above cases share a common factual
pattern: state action prevents or greatly hinders a willing distributor of information from disseminating a communication to willing recipients. 185 Therefore, from cases cited by Justice Brennan,
the scope of the right to receive ideas is intended to protect the
recipient of a communication from unreasonable governmental interference with the willing distributor's dissemination of the communication.186 Conversely, the right to receive ideas does not
include the right to receive ideas from an unwilling distributor.187
Once the right to receive ideas has been defined, the parties to
the action must be characterized in terms of that right in order to
determine whether the right has been violated. In Pico, the
School Board was the disseminator of the communication, the
182. "If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees." 425 U.S. at 757.
183. 102 S. Ct. at 2808 & n.20. Justice Brennan also cited First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), to
support his declaration that school board book removals violate the students'
rights to receive ideas. 102 S.Ct. at 2808. These cases, however, cannot be characterized in any sense as right to receive ideas cases. Bellotti upheld a corporation's
right to use corporate funds to influence ballot issues. Stanley held the right to
privacy protected a person's right to possess obscene material in their home; however, there is no complimentary right to publicly acquire or receive such obscene
material. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
184. See supra note 168. Another frequently cited case is Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S 367 (1969). Red Lion was cited in Right to Read Defense
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978); see supra note 78. In
Red Lion, the Court upheld the FCC fairness doctrine requiring broadcasters to
reserve time for rebuttal of personal attacks and political editorializing which
arose out of discussions of controversial public issues against a first amendment
attack by broadcasters. Reliance on Red Lion in book removal cases, however, is
misplaced, because it involves a federal regulation of an industry the government
has power to regulate.
185. For example, in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) a statute (state action) prohibited pharmacists (a willing distributor) from advertising prescription drug prices (the
communication) to the public (the recipient).
Justice Brennan also cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (1965), for the
proposition "the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Id. at 482. Although not
usually cited as a right to receive ideas case, its facts were similar. state law prohibited Griswold from giving information, instruction and medical advice concerning contraceptive devices to married persons.
186. 102 S.Ct. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "[W]here there is a willing distributor of materials, the government may not impose unreasonable obstacles to
dissemination by the third party." Id.
187. Accord 102 S.Ct. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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students were the recipients, and the books were the communication.188 Using these terms, it can be seen that the School Board
book removal did not violate the students' right to receive ideas
as defined by previous cases. Rather, Pico presented a case
where a school board simply became an unwilling distributor of a
communication by removing a book from the library. And as
stated earlier, the right to receive ideas has never been used to
compel an unwilling distributor to disseminate a communication.18 9
Because Justice Brennan's plurality opinion cannot be supported by right to receive ideas precedent, Justice Brennan must
have created a new right-a right to have the state provide access
to communications.190 Having created such a broad right, however, Justice Brennan found it necessary to limit its scope.
The first limitation Justice Brennan placed on this new right to
provide access was that it only applied to a school board's removal of books, not to its refusal to acquire the same books.191
The rationale behind this limitation was that the Constitution
prohibited the "official suppression of ideas."192 According to Justice Brennan, the affirmative act of removing a shelved book for
content-based reasons was an unconstitutional suppression of
ideas, while a refusal to acquire the same book for the identical
content-based reason was not. 193
Few would disagree with the notion that the Constitution prohibits the "official suppression of ideas." The phrase, nevertheless, fails to provide a useful analytical tool to answer first
amendment questions' 94 because the existence of a constitutional
right turns on matters irrelevant to the evil Justice Brennan seeks
to prevent-the official suppression of ideas. For example, two
school districts reject the same book for the same content-based
188. Chief Justice Burger characterized the School Board as a conduit of the

author's communication. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Although it
does not matter in the final analysis, the School Board would be more properly
characterized as the disseminator of the communication because of the inculcative
function the School Board advances in providing library books.
189. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
190. Accord 102 S. Ct. at 2817 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the plurality suggests
a new 'right' that, when shorn of the plurality's rhetoric, allows this Court to impose its own views about what books must be made available to students.") Id.
191. 102 S. Ct. at 2805.
192. Id. at 2810.
193. Id.
194. 102 S. Ct. at 2834 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

reason. In one school district the rejection is constitutional, because the board reviews the book before acquisition. On the
other hand, in the second school district, the rejection is unconstitutional, because the board's policy is to review the librarian's selection only after a complaint is received.195 Similarly, a student
who moves from a school district which refused to buy a book to
one which removed it from the library suddenly has an enforceable constitutional right. In both examples an enforceable constitutional right springs into existence even though in both
situations the students in the school district are in the same position-unable to find the book in the school library for contentbased reasons. Therefore, because the removal limitation fails to
establish how students in a school district which removes a book
are in any different constitutional position than students in a
school district which refuses to buy the same book, Justice Brennan's first limitation on this new right is without constitutional
significance.
If Justice Brennan's new right to provide access to ideas cannot
be limited to removal of library books by school boards, then the
right necessarily includes the right for students to have school
boards provide access to all ideas which the students request.
The problems with such a right are self-evident and would result
in completely depriving the school system of its legitimate function of inculcating fundamental community values1 96 and placing
the judiciary in the position of a super-school board. 197 Although
some commentators have advanced this position,198 no opinion
has even hinted at adopting such an expansive judicial role in the
school system.
The second limitation Justice Brennan placed on this new right
to provide access was that it applied only to books in the library
and not to those in the classroom or curriculum. 199 This limitation, however, is also inadequate. First, Justice Brennan failed to
respect this limitation, because one of the books was, in fact, removed from the curriculum. 200 Furthermore, Justice Brennan
195. 102 S. Ct. at 2821 n.8 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This inconsistency would
result in requiring school districts to adopt the first review policy in order to maintain control of the education of its students.
196. Id. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2817 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).

198. Comment, Schoolbooks, School Boards and the Constitution, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1092, 1116-17 (1980); Comment, FirstAmendment Limitations on the Power of
School Boards to Select and Remove High School Text and Library Books, 52 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 457, 476, 480-83 (1978).

199. 102 S. Ct. at 2805.
200. 102 S. Ct. at 2803 n.3. (THE FIXER, by Bernard Malamud). This error was
especially glaring because the questions presented in the Petition for Writ of Cer-
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failed to state why the distinction between the library and the
classroom-curriculum was of constitutional dimension. Instead,
Justice Brennan merely supported this limitation by quoting dicta
from previous cases which in no way supported the conclusion
that a school library had special constitutional protections.20 '
2 2 one decision
Brown v. Louisiana,
relied upon by Justice Brennan, reversed convictions under the breach of the peace statute of
five blacks who peacefully protested the segregation policy of a
public library. Keyishian v. Board of Regents,203 the other decision cited by Justice Brennan, held university faculty could not
be dismissed for refusing to take a loyalty oath. However, unlike
public school libraries, neither public libraries nor universities
fulfill an inculcative function. 204 Therefore, although students do
not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," 205 no previous decision by the
Court has held students gain first amendment rights by walking
into a school library.206
Again, it appears Justice Brennan's limitation on this new right
to provide access can neither be maintained in practice 207 nor
supported by authority.208 Accordingly, the right to provide access would include the right for students to have the school board
provide access to ideas in all areas of the school.
In summary, Justice Brennan answered the first question
presented in a school board book removal case by holding the students' right to receive ideas had been violated. 09 This holding,
however, was unsupported by precedent and, therefore, created a
new right.210 Furthermore, this new right to provide access is judicially unmanageable and would result in depriving school
boards of their legitimate inculcative function and making the
tiorari specifically addressed the issue of removal of books from the curriculum.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Pico.
201. 102 S. Ct. at 2809. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
202. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
203. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
204. 102 S. Ct. 2832 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
206. 102 S. Ct. at 2830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
207. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
209. 102 S. Ct. at 2807-08.
210. See supra notes 164-90 and accompanying text.

courts the arbiter of all educational decisions. 2 11
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion also answered the
first question affirmatively. 2 12 Justice Blackmun, however, held
the constitutional principle violated by a content-based book re213
moval to be that a "state may not suppress exposure to ideas."

A careful examination of Blackmun's principle reveals, however, that it is, in fact, Justice Brennan's removal limitation in disguise. 214 As Justice Blackmun describes the principle, a school
board may exercise a great deal of discretion in choosing among
books during the acquisition process. 215 However, once the book
is acquired, the board can only refuse to make the book available
(i.e. remove) under certain prescribed circumstances. 2 16 Accordingly, Justice Blackmun's principle suffers from many of the same
deficiencies as Justice Brennan's removal limitation. Although
Justice Blackmun expressly rejected any inference that school
boards would have an affirmative obligation to provide students
with ideas,217 Justice Blackmun, nevertheless, failed to explain
how the distinction between removing the book and refusing to
acquire it was consitutionally significant. Whether a school board
removes the book or refuses to acquire it, the students' exposure
to the ideas contained in the book is equally suppressed.
Justice White also addressed the first question raised in book
removal cases by voting to reverse the summary judgment. 21 8
Therefore, Justice White held the students' first amendment
rights were violated. However, because Justice White relied on
procedural grounds to avoid discussing the nature of the first
amendment right involved, a substantive analysis of Justice
White's opinion is impossible. 219
The only dissenting opinion to answer the first question was
211. See .-upra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
213. 102 S. Ct. 2813 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
214. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
217. 102 S. Ct. at 2813-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
218. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
219. Justice Rehnquist addressed the procedural nature of Justice White's concurring opinion stating Justice White's conclusion was inconsistent with the
Court's rule that any case warranting consideration in the opinion of four Justices
shall be taken and disposed of on the merits. 102 S. Ct. at 2827 n.1 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun concurred in Justice Rehquist's conclusion stating
"while the absence of record 'underscorels] the views of those of us who originally felt that the [case] should not be taken,' the case is here, and must be decided." 102 S. Ct. at 2816 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)).
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Chief Justice Burger's. 220 Accordingly, the Chief Justice held that
no first amendment rights were violated by a school board book
removal.
That Chief Justice Burger's answer to this first question opposed the responses of Justices Brennan and Blackmun was reflected in their respective methods of analysis. In contrast to
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who began their opinions with
the conclusion of what particular right has been violated by the
School Board's removal of the library books,221 Chief Justice Burger considered the nature of the asserted right, ascertained the
nature of the Board's act, and then determined whether the students' rights had been violated. For example, the Chief Justice
recognized the right to freedom of expression by stating "a school
board cannot ... prohibit a student from expressing certain
views, so long as that expression does not disrupt the educational
process."22 2 In considering the nature of the School Board's act,
the Chief Justice noted the students were still free to obtain the
books in question through alternative sources, to read the books,
and to discuss the books in the classroom or elsewhere.22 3 Finding the School Board's removal of the library books placed no restraints on the students' ability to express themselves, Chief
Justice Burger correctly held the students' freedom of expression
was not violated.224 Particularly, Chief Justice Burger considered
the nature and scope of the right to receive ideas 225 and the character of the School Board's act 226 before properly holding the
right to receive ideas did not include the right to have the School
District "provide continuing access to certain books."227 Failing to
find any previously recognized first amendment right violated by
the School Board's removal of the books, Chief Justice Burger
properly answered the first question in the negative.
220. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.

221. See supra notes 114 & 134 and accompanying text.
222. 102 S. Ct. at 2818 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).

223. 102 S.Ct. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. Id. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
226. 102 S.Ct. at 2819. "[B]y choosing not to retain certain books on the school
library shelf... [the School Board] simply chooses not to be the conduit for that
particular information." Id.
227. Id.

B.

Whether There Are Any State Interests Which Limit Students
FirstAmendment Right

Justice Brennan acknowledged in his plurality opinion that students' first amendment rights were limited by the "'special characteristics of the school environment.' "228 In cases involving
book removals, some of the factors which would limit the students' right include space and financial constraints, 229 curricular
relevance, 230 and the school board's function of inculcating
values.

23

1

Assuming arguendo that book removals by school boards violate students' rights to receive ideas, Justice Brennan failed to adequately consider the state's interests which limit those rights.
Although Justice Brennan agreed the inculcation of values was an
important state function, 232 Justice Brennan relied on the optional nature of the library to hold the School Board could not use
the library to advance that function. 233 Justice Brennan, however,
failed to state why the optional nature of the library made it
uniquely unavailable to the School Board in performing its inculcative function. If schools are to be used to inculcate values, then
surely libraries may play a role in that process. 23 4 In secondary

schools, the classroom and the library must be equally tailored to
the teaching of basic skills and values. 23 5 Justice Brennan's distinction between the classroom and the library transformed this
optional reading privilege into a right to have the optional reading
maintained 23 6 and deprived the state of the power to determine
which values it wished to inculcate via the library.
On the other hand, if Justice Brennan's right is properly recognized as the right to provide access,

237

then Justice Brennan com-

pletely failed to consider any state interest. Under such a right,
school boards are not only denied the power to determine which
values to inculcate, 23 8 school boards are also deprived of their authority over the book budget, the allocation of space in the library
and classroom, and the determination of which books are relevant
228. 102 S.Ct. at 2809 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
229. 102 S. Ct. at 2815 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
231. 102 S. Ct. at 2806.
232. Id. at 2806. "[P] ublic schools are vitally important.. . as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.'" Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
233. Id. at 2809.
234. Id. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
237. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
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239

to the curriculum.
Justice Blackmun conceded inculcating values was a legitimate
school board function 240 and limitation on the school board's
power to select academic materials conflicted with that function.241 To Justice Blackmun, however, this conflict merely presented a difficult, but not unsolvable, problem. 2 42 Justice
Blackmun solved the problem by holding school boards have
broad discretion in acquiring books and judicially restricted authority to remove books.243 Justice Blackmun, however, failed to
state why inculcation of values was any more of a state interest
than inculcating values by removing books. Justice Blackmun,
furthermore, failed to consider the School Board's interest in allocating space within the library. By placing the decision of which
books may be constitutionally removed from a library in the
courts, Justice Blackmun deprived the school board of the power
to allocate that space taken up by the book which a court refused
to remove.
Because Chief Justice Burger held that no right was violated by
a school board book removal, 2 Chief Justice Burger could not
discuss whether legitimate state interests limited that student
right. The remaining dissenting Justices, however, spoke to the
state interests involved in a book removal case. Justice Powell
addressed the effect the plurality opinion would have on the state
interests at stake. 245 The plurality's failure to respect legitimate
state interests by limiting the right it found to be violated would
result in depriving locally elected school boards the authority to
determine the educational policy of the school district.246 Even
worse in Justice Powell's eyes is that power will be vested in a
judge who is rarely as competent as school authorities to make
such decisions. 247 Justice Rehnquist addressed the state interest
by distinguishing between the state acting as a sovereign and as
an educator. 248 According to Justice Rehnquist, when the state
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
102 S. Ct. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 2815.
Id.
See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
102 S. Ct at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.

acts as an educator, certain state interests arise, such as inculcating values, and when school boards make decisions pursuant to
those state interests, first amendment questions that arise are dif249
ferent than those that arise when the state acts as a sovereign.
Justice O'Connor stated that if selecting books initially is within
the state interest, then removing those same books from the library must also be within the state interest.25 0
C. Whether There Are Any Restrictionson School Board Power
to Remove Books for Content-Based Reasons
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist "cheerfully concede [sI]" that a democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, cannot constitutionally order the removal of all books
written by or in favor of Republicans or that an all-white school
board, motivated by racial animosity, cannot constitutionally remove all books authored by blacks or advocating racial equality
and integration. 251 Justice Rehnquist's refusal to discuss the basis for this concession, however, raises a third question. If there
are no first amendment freedom of expression restrictions on
school board power to make content-based educational decisions,
then are there any restrictions on school board power? Although
none of the dissenting Justices substantively discussed this question, it is proposed there are three possible restrictions which
should be briefly discussed.
One possible restriction on school board power to remove books
is the parents' right to control the upbringing of their children. As
the Court held in Meyer v. Nebraska,252 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,25 3 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 254 states may not compel students to participate in educational activities which infringe on the
parental right to guide the intellectual upbringing of their children.255 However, because this right is not absolute, 256 and because courts will not interfere with the daily operations of a
school system unless a constitutional right is "directly and
sharply implicate [d] ,"257 the parental right to control the upbringing of a child would only prohibit school boards from taking ex249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

102 S. Ct. at 2830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102 S. Ct. at 2835 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2828-29.
262 U.S. 390 (1923). See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
268 U.S. 510 (1925). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.

256. Accord Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974); see supra note 57 and

accompanying text.
257. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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treme actions, such as compelling students to read certain books
or receive instruction for purely partisan political reasons.
Another limitation on school board power to make contentbased decisions is the free exercise clause of the first amendment.258 In Zorach v. ClauSon, 259 the Court held students could
not be compelled to attend religious exercises or instruction. 260
Accordingly, school boards could not constitutionally compel students to read certain religious books.
A final restriction on school board power to make contentbased decisions is the establishment of a religion clause of the
first amendment. 26 1 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 2 62 and Epperson v.
Arkansas,263 the Court held the state cannot use education as a
means to establish a state religion or church. Therefore, school
boards could not act in such a way so as to establish a religion.
VIII.

IMPACT

Although there was no majority opinion, Board of Education v.
Pico 26 4 did answer some of the questions in book removal cases.
First, five Justices agreed that when the reason or reasons for a
book removal are unresolved, summary judgment is improper. 265
Second, and more important, five Justices, including the vote implicit in Justice White's concurring opinion, agreed that the first
amendment places at least some restrictions on school boards in
removing library books from public schools. If this precedent is
followed in future decisions, the federal courts may become increasingly more involved in local school decisions. The extent to
which federal courts will become a "super censor,"266 however, is
258. The first amendment, in relevant part, states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...

."

U.S. CONsT. amend. I.

259. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In Zorach, the Court upheld a release time program
which permitted public schools to release students during the school day so that
they may leave the school grounds to attend religious centers for religious instruction and devotional exercises.
260. Id. at 311.
261. See supra note 258.
262. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court held state statutes which granted
parochial schools funds for purely secular education violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment.
263. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). For a discussion of Epprson, see supra note 65.
264. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
265. See supra notes 128-131 & 140 and accompanying text.
266. 102 S. Ct. at 2817 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).

unknown at this point because Pico left unanswered the nature of
the first amendment restrictions on school boards.
IX. CONCLUSION

Although the Justices in Pico were attempting to remedy what
may have been concededly misguided educational policy, the
Court became embroiled in an even greater problem. The rights
created by Justices Brennan and Blackmun are unsupported by
precedent, are judicially unmanageable and unlimitable to the
facts of this case, and divest school boards of their traditional
power to administer local schools and place that power in the
courts. If Pico were to become law, the Court would be placed in
the improper role of a "national school board" which imposes its
view in the state and local question of what educational materials
must be made available to students.
KELLY BOWERS
ADDENDUM

Currently, two actions challenging school board book removals
are pending in California courts. Wexner v. Anderson Union
High School District, 3 Cir. No. 61542, is on appeal to the California Third District Court of Appeal, and McKamey v. Mt. Diablo
Unified School District, No. 215577, is pending in Contra Costa
County Superior Court.

